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ABSTRACT
This paper seeks to examine the role third-party states may play as diplomatic
intervenors in intrastate wars. Because diplomatic interventions seek settlement outcomes
over military victory, understanding the efficacy of these interventions may provide
support for their usage over non-diplomatic options. I hypothesize that third-party state
power, in the form of military, economic, and political capabilities, will impact the
likelihood of diplomatic intervention outcome; more powerful third-party states will have
a greater likelihood of producing preferred outcomes. I use 12 multinomial regression
models to examine this relationship. I find that economic capabilities are the only factor
of state power that produce a significant relationship with partial settlement only.
Assessing this relationship, I suggest states with higher levels of economic production
and consumption may have positive, yet also limited, impacts as diplomatic intervenors
in intrastate war.
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INTRODUCTION
Although the post-WWII period has seen a marked decrease in the number of
traditional interstate wars relative to earlier historical intervals, the occurrence of
intrastate war has risen sharply in this same time period (Sarkees et al. 2003). Given the
high human, political, and economic costs of civil war, research aimed at understanding
and influencing these conflicts has increased in kind. The effect third-parties have in
intrastate wars is especially salient. Although the scope and conclusions of research in
this area varies, the general consensus is that outside parties may have a considerable
impact on these conflicts in a number of areas. This paper contributes to this area of
research by examining the role third-party intervenor characteristics may have on civil
war diplomatic intervention outcome.
Research undertaken on third-party intervention in interstate wars is diverse. This
ranges from the impact of economic and military interventions (Regan 1996; Regan
2002; Balch-Lindsay, Enterline, and Joyce 2008; Lockyer 2011; Balcells and Kalyvas
2014) to the efficacy of diplomatic interventions (Regan and Stam 2000; Doyle and
Sambanis 2000; Regan and Aydin 2006). A subset of this research explores
characteristics of the intervenors themselves (Greig and Regan 2008; Kydd 2003;
Svensson 2007; Aydin 2010). Although a significant relationship exists between thirdparty intervention, decisive military victory, and lasting peace (Fortna 2004; Toft 2010),
this paper focuses pointedly on studying diplomatic interventions as a potentially more
peaceful alternative.
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The basis for this paper is predicated on the premise that incumbent and rebel
combatants are unable to credibly commit to a negotiated settlement to terminate conflict
due to security concerns (Walter 1997). The involvement of a third-party may mitigate
this issue by guaranteeing to enforce the terms of an agreement (Walter 1997; Hartzell
and Hoddie 2003; Lundgren 2016). Considering third-parties as mediators of negotiated
settlements, I propose that the existing capabilities of third-party states will positively
impact the outcome of resolution-oriented discussions; states with higher overall relative
capacities will be more effectual mediators than those with less. The power a state wields,
and thus its resultant ability to monitor or enforce a negotiated settlement, is implicitly
present during the mediation process and allows negotiating combatants to anticipate the
potentiality of security guarantees and come to agreement, even before explicit
guarantees may be formalized.
This contribution occupies a gap in the current research by considering the
dynamics of third-party power on intrastate war in a non-structural capacity. While there
exists scholarship focused on how intervenors’ capabilities, especially those that are
military- and economic-based, may impact conflicts, this generally coincides with
increasing lethality to bring about a decisive conclusion to conflict. By focusing on
diplomatic intervention instead, my research seeks to indicate how powerful states may
wield their influence in a way that may reach a lower-casualty conclusion. Showing that
all intervenors are not equal, this alternative to continued conflict could potentially
indicate how states that have both the abilities and desire to impact an intrastate conflict
may do so in a diplomatic, and less lethal, way.
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In this paper, I test my hypotheses using data that combines the capabilities of
intervening states (Singer et al. 1972, Gleditsch 2002, Marshall et al. 2016) with the
outcomes of diplomatic interventions (Regan et al. 2009). Although my original
argument considered the role of state power specifically regarding mediation, for testing
purposes I assume these implicit capabilities will also have the same positive effect on
other forms of diplomatic intervention. After testing, I find that states, irrespective of
power, are less likely to produce preferred civil war outcomes than non-states. In
addition, state economic capabilities are the only facet of state power that may impact the
likelihood of some civil war outcomes.
This paper proceeds as follows. Following the introduction, the literature review
discusses the existing research relevant to the topic of this paper. Next, I describe my
theory and introduce my hypotheses. The fourth section describes the methodology and
data used for testing, while the fifth part analyzes and discusses my findings. Finally, I
conclude with a summary of my observations, the limitations of this research, and future
topics of research in this area.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Due to the rise of intrastate war occurrence in the post-WWII landscape relative
to other types of wars (Sarkees et al. 2003), the study of these conflicts has also
increased. This body of research ranges from coding-based considerations for empirical
testing (Gleditsch et al. 2002, Sambanis 2004) and factors affecting civil war onset
(Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Sambanis 2001; Buhaug and Gates 2002; Fearon and Laitin
2003), to war duration and termination durability (Walter 1997; Fearon 2004; Toft 2010).
Although the focus of this paper is limited to third-party intervention in intrastate wars, it
is important to preface this more specific literature review that follows with a general and
brief discussion of the themes in civil war research to date.
Broadly, the literature defines civil wars as conflicts that take place within the
confines of a state in which the incumbent government is one of the main participants
(Sambanis 2004). A large subset of intrastate research aims to disaggregate civil wars by
type and specify factors that correlate with these types. One sphere of research differs
over whether grievances over economic or political inequalities (Sambanis 2001;
Besançon 2005; Humphreys and Weinstein 2008; Cederman et al. 2011) or resourcebased greed (Lichbach 1994; Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Ross 2006) affects civil war
onset. Other groups of researchers interpret this divide in terms of ethnic and non-ethnic
wars (Sambanis 2001; Besançon 2005; Cederman et al. 2011) and argue that they should
be considered separately. Still other researchers focus on correlates that may be
explanatory, ranging from conditions that favor insurgency (Fearon and Laitin 2003) and
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explanations for the difference in intrastate war duration (Fearon 2004), to war demand
and geographic scope (Buhaug and Gates 2002). For the purposes of this paper, I do not
segregate intrastate wars by type, cause, or other explanatory factors and instead consider
all conflicts together. I base this decision on Regan’s (1996) observation that intervention
characteristics have a greater impact on diplomatic intervention outcome than conflict
characteristics, as well as the practice of other research in this field of study (Bercovitch
and Jackson 2001; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003; Regan and Aydin 2006).
An increasingly large subset of civil war research concerns itself with the
influence third-party actors may have on ongoing conflicts, specifically regarding the
deployment of intervention strategies. This topic is diverse and ranges from the type
(Regan 1996; Regan 2002; Balcells and Kalyvas 2014) and timing (Regan and Stam
2000; Aydin 2010) of interventions to characteristics of the intervenors themselves
(Doyle and Sambanis 2000; Kydd 2003; Abdelrahman and Lee 2016). The primary goal
of this literature is to study how the involvement of third-parties can impact a conflict in
terms of structure, duration, and outcome.
Regan and Aydin (2006) broadly classify third-party interventions into two types,
defined by how the tactic affects the combatant relationship. The first type seeks to
influence the structure of the conflict by providing incentives and deterrents; military and
economic strategies are examples of this form of intervention. The second type, using
diplomatic intervention strategies, aims to manipulate the information actors hold with
regard to the abilities and resolve of the opposing side, as well as the nature of the
conflict as a whole. This may be intelligence about the conflict—such as relative
capabilities—not privy to both parties or the conveyance of information relating to the
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resolve, compromise points, or fears of one of both parties that they may not be able to
credibly communicate themselves. These tactics may be deployed singly, in combination
with one another, or as a series of strategic actions. Although the focus of this paper is
third-party diplomatic intervention, structural interventions may precede or follow
diplomatic ones. As such, understanding the relationship between structural tactics and
civil war outcome also informs our understanding of diplomatic-based outcomes. I will
briefly summarize structural-based interventions for comparison.
Research regarding military and economic third-party interventions is predicated
upon understanding the effects of the manipulation of relative capabilities among civil
war parties. From the perspective of the intervenor state, the purpose of this assistance is
to hasten a decisive military victory (Walter 1997; Fortna 2004). Specifically, these
changes in relative power can impact the form of conflict (Lockyer 2011; Balcells and
Kalyvas 2014), duration (Regan 1996, 2002; Regan and Aydin 2006; Balch-Lindsay et al.
2008), or outcome (Gent 2008). For the purposes of this paper, I focus on diplomatic
interventions exclusively, as they consist of strategies intended to discourage the
continued violence necessitated by decisive military victory. Diplomatic interventions,
especially those that take the form of mediation, encourage conflict resolution by
engaging both parties to dialogue and coincide with temporary eases in conflict as
negotiations occur. In addition, diplomatic interventions also serve as a more ethically
acceptable alternative action of states to employ at the international level.
By far the most common, and commonly analyzed, form of diplomatic
interventions are third-party mediation efforts in intrastate conflicts. Primary research in
this field focuses on the varied effects this form of intervention may have on a conflict.
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This ranges from timing of diplomatic intervention (Regan and Stam 2000; Aydin 2010)
and its effect on duration (Regan and Aydin 2006), to state-specific factors pertinent to
the offer and acceptance of mediation (Greig and Regan 2008; Abdelrahman and Lee
2016), to the impact of biased mediation on outcome (Kydd 2003; Svensson 2007).
Diplomatic intervention research is also highly interested in facets of mediation that
impact post-negotiation outcomes (Walter 1997; Hartzell and Hodie 2003; Fortna 2004;
Toft 2010; Driscoll 2012).
In the proceeding sections of this literature review I examine two themes of
academic research associated with the goal of this paper: general research regarding the
impacts of diplomatic interventions as a whole, as well as more specific research focused
on how third-party characteristics may transform the relationship between diplomatic
intervention and intrastate conflict. Broadly, diplomatic intervention is expected to alter
both the duration and outcome of civil wars. This relationship stems fundamentally from
the work of Walter (1997). She argues that civil wars that do not achieve a decisive, onesided victory are more difficult to conclude in the long run because both the incumbent
and rebel parties still possess military capacities. Since in the case of negotiated
settlements one or both sides are generally asked to disarm, it is difficult for parties to
demilitarize in an anarchic environment when the risk of doing so may lead to
annihilation. To balance this, Walter argues that the introduction of a third-party into the
negotiation process will increase the likelihood of success and long-lasting peace since
they can enforce the terms of the treaty and allow combatants to credibly commit to
disarmament. It is the credible commitment of the intervenor, as well as the facilitation of
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credible commitment among warring parties, that serves as the mechanism that propels
third-party diplomatic intervention and its impact on intrastate conflict.
Both Regan and Stam (2000) and Regan and Aydin (2006) find a statistical
relationship between third-party mediation efforts and duration, although not a simple
one. Regan and Stam (2000) find that the timing of the intervention plays a critical role;
while mediation early and late in a conflict is linked to reducing expected duration,
mediation in what is ex post the middle of the conflict actually increases the length of a
civil war. Regan and Aydin’s work (2006) suggests differing results. They find that thirdparty mediation is most effective in the middle of the conflict, with early and late
interventions increasing the probability of increased war duration. Adding another
dimension to this strain of research, Aydin (2010) tests how third-party strategy can
impact the timing of intervention. She finds that while overall states are more likely to
attempt to mediate conflicts early, as fighting continues (thus indicating said
interventions have failed and imparting the difficulty of resolving the conflict) states
become more hesitant to intervene. It is clear from these works that diplomatic
intervention can be effective if deployed at the right time.
Another variety of third-party diplomatic intervention research focuses on the
attributes of states offering mediation. Since mediation is, by definition, consensual
(Bercovitch 1997), there are factors that affect both the offering and acceptance of
negotiation. Greig and Regan (2008) find that third-party offers for negotiation are more
likely when the intervenor has interests in the civil war state; this may be in the form of
historical linkages, contiguity, or even prior conflict involvement. Abdelrahman and Lee
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(2016) argue that the increased likelihood of mediation offers from states neighboring
civil wars is due to the negative impact a contiguous conflict may have on its neighbor.
Contrary to Aydin (2010), Greig and Regan (2008) also find that third-parties are more
likely to extend an offer of mediation when multiple other parties are already involved.
Offer acceptance, however, has different findings. Historical ties to the mediator actually
decrease the likelihood of offer acceptance, while the reputation of the mediator increases
it. The timing of acceptance differs as well. Parties involved in a civil conflict are more
likely to reject mediation at what is ex post the beginning and end of conflicts, a
conclusion that aligns with the efficacy of intervention timing as investigated by Regan
and Aydin (2006).
Scholars expect bias among intervenors to have an influence on the efficacy of
mediations. Although the general expectation may be that an unbiased mediator will be a
more effective negotiator, both Kydd (2003) and Svensson (2007) find that biased
mediators in civil war negotiations associate with an increased likelihood of the
mediation ending in a negotiated settlement. A biased mediator conveys information,
such as opponent resolve and resources, more credibly and thus facilitates more
constructive negotiations (Kydd 2003). Svensson (2007) argues mediators biased
specifically in favor of the incumbent are the most effective; because the incumbent is
generally losing power (reputational, military, political, etc.) relative to the rebel group in
negotiations, it is important that they receive more support to continue negotiations
towards a productive end.
Finally, a large segment of third-party intervention research focuses on
influencing the post-settlement outcome of mediation. Rather than measuring success of
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diplomatic intervention in terms of decreasing war duration or reaching a final outcome,
the goal of this area of examination centers around providing long-lasting peace via
decreasing war recurrence. Building upon Walter’s (1997) work, Fortna (2004) also finds
that decisive military victory is better with regard to the likelihood of decreasing war
reoccurrence. Given that this does not take place in a negotiated settlement, she finds that
there are two factors that may also impact the durability of peace in a mediation scenario:
the formalization of peace agreements and the presence of peacekeeping post-conflict.
With regard to the former, Hartzell and Hoddie (2003) observe that negotiated
settlements with robust and multidimensional power sharing (e.g. political, economic,
and military integration) significantly decrease the likelihood of war recurrence.
Likewise, Driscoll (2012) argues for increased incumbent-rebel incorporation, but in a
realpolitik fashion; post-civil war settlement is treated as a coalition formation game and
success is predicated on the cooptation of rebels or rebel leaders into the existing
government system. In Driscoll’s model, rebels do not face a dilemma to disarm because
they become part of the state itself.
Regarding the research goal of this paper, there exists a dearth of research
interested in the capacities of states as third-party diplomatic intervenors and their impact
on conflict outcome. The closest work to this involves the effects of intergovernmental
organizations (IOs) on negotiation and post-negotiation outcomes. Doyle & Sambanis
(2000) and Lundgren (2016) find that third-party involvement in the form of IOs or
multilateral coalitions have the greatest influence on peace durability. Lundgren
specifically incorporates the presence of IOs from the mediation to peace enforcement
stages of combat. He argues that IOs with the ability to deploy peacekeeping or
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monitoring missions outperform IOs without the capacity to intercede post-conflict in
negotiations due to the implicit knowledge that they can credibly enforce a negotiated
settlement with force. It is clear that the involvement of a militarily capable and willing
third-party in diplomatic interventions has a significant impact on the post-conflict
landscape of an intrastate war.
Finally, building upon Lundgren’s (2016) observations about IO capacity and
negotiation and post-negotiation outcomes, I conceptualize this relationship with regard
to states. Similar to IOs, state capacity and the resultant ability to engage in monitoring or
peacekeeping post-conflict may vary and impact negotiation outcome. The credible
communication of these capacities is key and rests with the perceived power of a state.
While this certainly may include a conception of power in the realist sense—overt
coercion by self-interested states in the national interest (Walt 1998)—it is not exclusive.
Barnett and Duval (2005) argue that power can also be expressed inconspicuously via
social relations. This includes “joint action through mutual agreement and interactions in
which one actor is able to convince another actor to alter voluntarily and freely its beliefs,
interests, or action” (Barnett and Duval 2005, 42). Thus, power may be also expressed by
a third-party state involved in consensual negotiation among states.
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THEORY
Given the preceding literature review, this paper explores the relationship
between the capabilities of third-party intervenors and the outcomes of the diplomatic
interventions they undertake. Although diplomatic interventions is a broad term
encompassing varying activities, in this paper I follow Regan and Aydin’s (2006)
example by generally conflating mediation and diplomatic efforts (of which mediation is
an extensive subset) as serving the same function with regard to testing. I assume that the
goal of diplomatic interventions, as opposed to military or economic ones, is to credibly
provide information leading to settlements that terminate, rather than facilitate, additional
violence.
To examine this, I frame the mediator-participant relationship in intrastate war as
one of explicit and implicit communication. The aims of explicit communication are
straightforward: a third-party intervenes diplomatically to convey information between
combatants that they may not be able to credibly relay to each other. A third-party may
also formally guarantee to monitor or enforce peace post-settlement (Walter 1997). There
exists a large body of research that recognizes the positive relationship between these
direct forms of communication and the outcome of diplomatic interventions (Walter
1997; Hartzell and Hoddie; Regan and Aydin 2006; Lundgren 2016). While I
emphatically agree that explicit communication is a fundamental mechanism of the
association between diplomatic interventions and resultant outcome, it is not exclusively
explanatory.
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In addition to explicit modes of communication, I argue that a dialogue of implicit
communication exists in civil war conflict between mediators and participants. This
results in a series of implications and inferences that pervade diplomatic intervention
attempts, while also running concurrently with the explicit forms of communication
discussed previously. Drawing from Lundgren’s (2006) observations on the efficacy of
international organizations as mediators, I contend that the abilities of a state to credibly
provide (and not necessarily explicitly offer) security guarantees impacts the likelihood
of third-party diplomatic intervention reaching a constructive, successful outcome.
Essentially: state power, even unexpressed, permeates dialogue between groups. A state
than can feasibly commit to assuring a negotiated settlement by implicitly conveying
their known capabilities will have greater intervention success than those without said
capabilities.
Comparing and contrasting the diplomatic intervention attempts of the United
States, Chad, and Thailand help to illustrate this theory. In her case study of the Bosnian
War, Paczulla (2004) chronicles the intervention strategies of the United States, while
Abdelrahman and Lee (2016) examine the maneuvers of Chad in the Sudanese conflict in
Darfur and Thailand during the Cambodian Civil War. In all cases, multiple intervention
strategies—economic, military, and diplomatic—were deployed and a variety of different
types of actors became involved at different times. The greatest difference between these
intervenors was their international power; the United States acted as an acknowledged
military, economic, and political leader, while Thailand and Chad intervened as smaller,
neighboring countries without any substantial influence.
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In the cases of Thailand and Chad, both states entered their respective conflicts as
intervenors due to concerns for regional stability. Both states also initially intervened
unsuccessfully in their neighboring conflicts with more extreme, biased, and sometimes
non-diplomatic strategies. Ultimately, this lack of coordination and posturing led to
tensions among these states, other intervening parties, and the conflicting parties
themselves. Both Thailand and Chad eventually revised their intervention strategies by
using more powerful international and external actors to bolster their diplomatic actions
with limited eventual impact on the conflicts and their resolutions (Abdelrahman and Lee
2016).
In contrast to the Thai and Chadian efforts, the intervention of the United States in
the Bosnian War culminated in a more successful outcome. Acting after years of
unsuccessful, yet valuable, international efforts by states and international organizations,
the United States mediated the Dayton Accords to its eventual conclusion, resulting in the
end of the intrastate conflict. According to Paczulla (2004), part of the success the United
States experienced was due to the amount of pressure its diplomats were able to exert on
the mediating parties. Although the conflicts in which Thailand, Chad, and the United
States intervened were notably different, it is clear that the multi-dimensional power that
the United States wielded in the international system aided its eventual success as a
diplomatic intervenor.
As a precursor to testing state power and its impact on diplomatic intervention
outcome, it is necessary to briefly examine how states and non-states perform against
each other irrespective of power differences. While I posit that state power is integral to
success, I also assume that selection bias is in effect; states with higher capabilities are
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more likely to intervene in civil wars. Because of this, I expect the pool of state
intervenors to be more capable, and thus more successful than other types of actors. This
leads to hypothesis 1, which is as follows:
Hypothesis 1: Third-party states will be more likely to generate successful
diplomatic intervention outcomes than non-states.
Dealing specifically with state actors, I hypothesize that state power, also
conceptualized as state capabilities or capacity, will impact the likelihood of preferred
civil war outcome. State capacity is a nuanced quality that encompasses a range of areas:
from political and bureaucratic effectiveness to economic productivity (Hendrix 2010).
Of these, military capabilities are the most conspicuous facet. States with relatively high
military capacities can implicitly communicate their ability to guarantee security aspects
of negotiated settlements. As such, hypothesis 2 is as follows:
Hypothesis 2: Third-party states with greater military capabilities will be more
likely to generate successful diplomatic intervention outcomes.
Military considerations, however, are only one facet of state power. A state may
be militarized and yet lack the economic faculty to credibly express their capabilities
outside the borders of their own state. Thus, the economic capacity of a state is also key
to the implicit communication of power. States with higher levels of consumption and
production may have the resources necessary to potentially guarantee or convey the
ability to enforce a mediation outcome. Hypothesis 3 addresses this relationship.
Hypothesis 3: Third-party states with greater economic capabilities will be more
likely to generate successful diplomatic intervention outcomes.
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Finally, I also conceptualize state power as a measure of state political capacity. I
use this term to indicate the extent of state regime stability and internal political control.
On a political continuum ranging from fully authoritarian to fully democratic, those states
at the poles of the continuum are less likely to experience political violence than semidemocracies in the middle. In addition, strong autocracies and consolidated democracies
have a longer median survival rate than anocracies (Hegre et al. 2005; Vreeland 2008). It
follows that conflicting parties in a civil war environment may perceive those regimes not
experiencing political violence or instability to be preferable to anocratic states as
diplomatic intervenors. For instance, it is unlikely that states that are experiencing
political violence and lack the ability to enforce policies within their own borders will be
able to convey the willingness or ability to become involved in and effectively enforce
any diplomatic intervention outcome. By contrast, politically stable states (either by
democratic or authoritarian means) will be able to more effectively convey their
willingness and ability to successfully mediate and enforce a variety of preferred
outcomes among warring parties, depending on the preferences and linkages of the
conflicting parties themselves (Grieg and Regan 2008). As such, hypothesis 4 is as
follows:
Hypothesis 4: Third-party states with greater political capacity will be more
likely to generate successful diplomatic intervention outcomes.
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RESEARCH DESIGN
In the research design for this paper, I attempt to account for the relationship
between state capability and diplomatic intervention outcome. First, to justify my focus
on diplomatic intervention among states, I test the relationship between outcomes with
states as intervenors and non-states as intervenors to determine whether a disparate
relationship exists. Following this, I test my hypotheses for states only. I expect higher
capacity third-party states to outperform lower capacity third-party states when engaging
in diplomatic interventions.
Data
In this paper, I use the Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War Dataset (Regan et
al. 2009) for the purposes of testing the impact of state capability on diplomatic
intervention outcome. I derive the dependent variable from this dataset, using a modified
coding scheme of the authors. I also use this dataset for several control variables. The
Civil War Dataset (Regan et al. 2009) is an advancement upon Regan’s (1996) previous
intervention data, which only included economic and military interventions.
The Regan et al. (2009) dataset includes information on 438 diplomatic
interventions in 68 unique conflicts spanning from 1945 to 1999. An obvious drawback
to this dataset is timespan of the data. Despite the omission of relatively recent
interventions, this is the most complete dataset that includes diplomatic intervention
outcome data. It is also important to note that, following the previous work of Regan
(1996), Regan et al. (2009) also lower the casualty threshold for civil war from 1,000
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deaths to 200 deaths to account for a greater number of disputes. The lower casualty
threshold creates a stronger test of my hypotheses by accounting for earlier interventions
in conflicts that may not yet have reached the levels of violence resulting in 1,000 deaths.
This inclusion may help to indicate patterns of successful intervention at earlier stages of
intrastate conflict. The unit of observation is the conflict month.
This paper also uses variables from the Correlates of War Project’s National
Material Capabilities Dataset (Singer et al. 1972). This dataset includes the Composite
Indicator of National Capability (CINC) variable, as well as its component parts. This
variable is intended to represent the relative capabilities of states as an indicator of
international influence or power. CINC consists of six state-level variables: total
population, urban population, iron and steel production, energy consumption, military
personnel, and military expenditure of all state members. The timespan of the data ranges
from 1816-2012. Although this interval is more extensive than Regan et al.’s (2009), its
use is limited to those years available in the Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War
Dataset.
In addition to the Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War Dataset (Regan et al.
2009) and National Material Capabilities Dataset (Singer et al. 1972), this paper also
utilizes the Polity V: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions (Marshall and Gurr
2018) dataset. This provides a variable to measure a composite indicator of political
capability based on regime type. This dataset includes information on states with a
population of over 500,000 for the years 1800-2018. As with Singer et al.’s (1972) data,
the time range is limited to years available in the Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War
Dataset (Regan et al. 2009). Finally, I also use data from Gleditsch’s (2002) Expanded

19
Trade and GDP dataset to provide economic data on intervening states. As with the
previous variables, the usable data is limited to the timeframe of the dependent variable.
Dependent Variable
Diplomatic Intervention Outcome
I derive the diplomatic intervention outcome variable from the Diplomatic
Interventions and Civil War Dataset (Regan et al. 2009). In Regan et al.’s (2009) dataset,
they code the variable as follows: 0= no agreement, 1= ceasefire, 2= partial settlement,
3= full settlement, and 4= ongoing. Besides the ongoing disputes category, the scale
increases by the authors’ preferred outcome. Thus, full settlements are preferable to
partial settlements, which are preferable to ceasefires. Full settlements, partial
settlements, and ceasefires are all preferable to no agreement reached.
For interpretation purposes, I have adjusted Regan et al.’s (2009) coding. For the
purposes of this paper an ongoing dispute (4) is not preferable to either a ceasefire (1),
partial (2), or full settlement (4). To reflect this, I have combined no agreement (0) and
ongoing dispute (4) into the same category (0). The new formulation of the variable is
coded as follows: 0= no agreement/ongoing dispute, 1= ceasefire, 2= partial settlement,
and 3= full settlement. As discussed later in this section, I use multinomial logit models
to test my relationships; as such, the dependent variable is treated as unordered. I discuss
the grounds for this in further detail below.
Independent Variables
Considering the theory section and following hypotheses, I use four variables to
operationalize my tests: actor type, composite state power, economic capabilities, and
political capacity. Table 1 presents the summary statistics for these variables, which
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include: number of observations, mean value, minimum value, maximum value, standard
deviation, and expected relationship.
Table 1

Summary Statistics for Variables of Interest

Actor Type
In my first hypothesis, I contend that states and non-states have differing
diplomatic intervention outcomes. To test this, I create a dummy variable (State Actor) to
indicate whether an actor is a state (1) or non-state (0). This variable comprises 251 states
or state combinations and 187 non-states or non-state combinations. 1 As per hypothesis 1,
I expect states to have a greater likelihood of achieving preferred diplomatic outcomes
than non-states due to the self-selection of higher capacity states becoming involved in
diplomatic intervention in the first place.
Military Power
My second hypothesis asserts that intervenor states with greater composite
military capabilities will be more likely to generate successful diplomatic intervention
outcomes. To test this, I use National Material Capabilities Dataset’s (Singer et al. 1972)
CINC variable (Military Power). As noted previously, the CINC variable is a composite
variable consisting of total population, urban population, iron and steel production,

1

A table of all state and non-state actors and groups may be viewed in Appendix A, Table A.1.
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energy consumption, military personnel, and military expenditure of states. Scholars
commonly use this variable to represent the international influence or relative power of a
state (Geller 1993; Allen et al. 2018), although it is not without its criticisms (Kadera and
Sorokin 2004). I also use this variable for its measure of relative power, assuming states
wield their international influence during diplomatic interventions to influence the
outcome. As such, it is expected that states with higher CINC scores will have an
increased likelihood of achieving the desired diplomatic intervention outcomes, either
full or partial settlements.
Economic Capabilities
I consider the relationship between economic capabilities and diplomatic
interventions in my third hypothesis. I operationalize this variable (Economic
Capabilities) using Gleditsch’s (2002) Expanded Trade and GDP dataset. Since GDP data
is often incomplete for developing and conflict-torn states, Gleditsch uses additional data
sources and data interpolation to provide consistent estimation of the economic resources
and strength of these countries. I expect states with higher economic capacities to have an
increased likelihood of achieving conflict settlement.
Political Capacity
To test my fourth hypothesis, I use regime authority measures from the Polity V:
Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions (Marshall and Gurr 2018) dataset. My
primary variable of interest is the combined polity score (Political Capacity), which the
authors compute by subtracting their score for institutionalized autocracy from their
institutionalized democracy score; the autocracy and democracy scores are themselves
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composite indicators which are composed of properties of democratic regimes. The
combined polity score ranges from -10 (autocratic) to +10 (democratic).
For the purposes of testing, I square the polity score (Political Capacity Squared)
to create a range from 0-100. Higher values on this scale will indicate stronger regimes,
either autocratic or democratic. As noted in my theory section, states at either end of the
autocracy-democracy continuum are less politically violent and experience longer lasting
regimes that those states in the middle of the continuum (Hegre et al. 2005). The
expectation is that regime strength will associate with an increased likelihood of
diplomatic intervention success.
It is important to note that usage of the Polity variable is not without its concerns.
Both Vreeland (2008) and Treier and Jackman (2008) find fault with the components and
aggregate makeup of the Polity variable itself, suggesting that its use as an independent
variable may not be precise (Trier and Jackman 2008) and may over-inflate the regimepolitical violence relationship (Vreeland 2008). Högström (2013) however, finds that the
Polity data, when compared to the alternative Freedom House, produces results that are
less dependent on economic results for explanatory power. For the purposes of this paper,
this is preferable due to the inclusion of alternate independent variables that measure
economic capabilities separately.
Control Variables
I include several control variables that are linked to diplomatic intervention
outcome in previous research.
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Intervention Timing
The control variable for intervention timing (Timing and Timing Squared) is a
count of months since the start of a conflict and is a part of the Diplomatic Interventions
and Civil War Dataset (Regan et al. 2009). The expected effect varies; while Regan and
Stam (2000) find that interventions at the beginning and what is ex post the end of a
conflict will have a greater likelihood of success, Regan and Aydin (2006) observe
interventions in the middle of a conflict to be most effective.
Number of Diplomatic Interventions
The variable for number of diplomatic interventions (Diplomatic Intervention) is
from Regan et al.’s (2009) Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War Dataset. This variable
measures the total number of diplomatic interventions in a conflict. Regan and Stam
(2000) find the number of mediation attempts and duration to be positively correlated.
Considering this, I expect higher numbers of diplomatic intervention attempts in a
conflict to be associated with a decreased likelihood of conflict settlement.
Unilateral Intervention
The variable for unilateral intervention (Unilateral Intervention) is a dichotomous
variable from the Diplomatic Interventions and Civil War Dataset (Regan et al. 2009) that
indicates whether the diplomatic intervention was unilateral (1) or not (0). Regan (2002)
finds that unilateral interventions are less effective than multilateral ones, but his research
tests military and economic interventions only. Considering the dearth of research related
specifically to the efficacy of unilateral diplomatic interventions, I will assume the same
causal mechanisms are at play and that unilateral diplomatic interventions will also
decrease the likelihood of preferred civil war outcomes.
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Models
To test the relationship between state capability and diplomatic intervention
outcome I use a logistic regression model (LRM). A LRM takes into account the
dichotomous nature of the dependent variable, diplomatic intervention outcome. Since
the dependent variable is dichotomous in a LRM, a maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) model is a better fit than an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model, which
works under the assumption that the variable is continuous in nature and evenly
distributed. The correct model specification allows for the outcomes of testing to be
interpreted accurately by bounding the possible range from zero to one, estimating the
logged-odds of an event occurring, and allowing for non-linearity in the change in the
dependent variable. OLS lacks the bounding feature and thus may produce out of bounds
predictions. In this paper, I use a variant of the LRM, which is the multinomial logistic
regression (MLR) model. MLR allows for testing of relationships with more than two
distinct outcomes. I utilized MLR, rather than an ordered logistic regression (OLR)
model, because it does not assume consistent parameters across all outcome thresholds,
also known as the “parallel regression assumption.” Instead, the MLR model allows
comparison of discrete outcomes against a base outcome, which in this case is “No
Settlement/Ongoing Conflict.”
I use 12 models to explore the relationship between third-party states and
diplomatic intervention outcome. All models utilize the same dependent variable,
diplomatic intervention outcome, which is treated as unordered. Models 1-6 correspond
to my hypotheses. Model 1 tests the effects of third-party actors on outcome by
differentiating between state and non-state actors. Models 2-6 test state-specific
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attributes—military power, economic capability, and political capacity—for state actors
only. Models 7-12 use the disaggregated CINC variables (Singer et al. 1972) to serve as a
further robustness test for the expected relationships of models 2-6.
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RESULTS
I include the results for the following discussion in Tables 2-13. As stated
previously, all models use multinomial logistic regression to estimate the proposed
relationships. Tables 2-7 correspond with testing for hypotheses 1-4, while tables 8-13
present additional examination based on the results of models 1-6.
In hypothesis 1, I project that states and non-states will have differing effects on
intrastate third-party intervention outcome. Contrary to the expected relationship, that
states will have a positive effect on intervention outcome, the results of model 1 (Table 2)
indicate that state actors have a significant, negative effect on all outcome categories.
State actors are less successful than non-state actors at achieving preferred intervention
outcomes. The results are significant at the 5% level for partial settlement and full
settlement, and significant at the 1% level for ceasefire. Additionally, control variables
for timing squared and diplomatic intervention count achieve significance in multiple
outcomes, while unilateral intervention is highly significant across all outcomes. 2

2

Upon suggestion, I have included contiguity as an additional control variable following the work of
Fearon and Laitin (2003). The variable did not achieve significance in any estimation. The variable did not
fundamentally alter my findings with only minor variation in various p-values and coefficients. In
Appendix B, Tables B.2-B.6 provide examples demonstrating this.
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Table 2

Results for State Actor Model

This unexpected relationship may have multiple causes. It is possible that the preexisting linkages between a third-party intervenor and a civil war state that increase the
likelihood of outside state involvement (Greig and Regan 2008) also detrimentally
complicate the diplomatic peace processes. Conversely, since the independent variable
for state actor measures state actors of all capabilities, there is potential for both high- and
low-performing states to impact outcome differently. While overall, state intervenors may
have a negative impact on outcome, a small number of higher capacity states may impact
diplomatic outcome differently. Finally, the conflict outcomes of state and non-state
actors may experience different causal processes. While I hypothesize that relative power
matters for states, I also assume that non-state actors do not possess these same variables
of power for comparison (in addition, scholars do not measure these variables for nonstate actors). Given this, comparing state and non-state actors may provide information
on relative success, but it does not impart any understanding regarding how they impact
outcomes differently. I explore state-only factors further in models 2-12.
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Hypothesis 2 expects the CINC variable (Singer et al. 1972), a proxy for relative
state influence and military power, to correlate positively with the likelihood of achieving
a preferred diplomatic intervention outcome. I test this relationship in model 2 (Table 3).
Although a majority of the coefficients positively correlate with preferred civil war
outcome, they do not achieve significance. As with model 1, the variable for unilateral
intervention is the only control variable that is significant in the expected direction across
all outcomes, with diplomatic intervention count achieving significance at the 5%
threshold for two outcomes. This finding suggests that military power and its
concomitant international influence may not give a state actor a particular advantage
regarding the likelihood of achieving a preferred diplomatic intervention outcome. Given
my hypothesis, it follows that the implicit communication of military power and credible
settlement commitment between intervenor and warring parties may either be nonexistent
or, more likely, simply not as formally defined, and thus less actionable, as explicit
communication.
Table 3

Results for Military Power Model
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Similar to hypothesis 2, in hypothesis 3 I anticipate that state-specific attributes
will positively influence the likelihood of preferred intervention outcome. Unlike
hypothesis 2, however, hypothesis 3 presents economic capabilities as the source of
influential power. I test this using Gleditsch’s (2002) Expanded Trade and GDP dataset in
model 3 (Table 4). The coefficients for economic capabilities are positive across all
outcomes but do not achieve significance. Since the results given in model 3 do not
support my hypothesis, it appears that no considerable relationship exists between state
economic power and diplomatic intervention outcome. Once again, the control variable
unilateral intervention achieves significance in the expected direction across all
outcomes, while diplomatic intervention count is significant in two outcomes. While state
economic characteristics of power may not play an appreciable role in settlement
outcome, this does not indicate that economic influence does not impact the diplomatic
intervention process as a whole.
Table 4

Results for Economic Capabilities Model
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In model 4 I test my fourth hypothesis, which projects that states with higher
political capacity will be more likely to generate preferred intervention outcomes. In this
model, I include my variable for political capacity, a square of the state intervenor polity
score (Marshall and Gurr 2018), as well as its respective non-square term. 3 The results of
model 4 (Table 5) are generally consistent with expectations, with the exception of a
negative coefficient for full-settlement outcomes. All outcomes, however, fail to achieve
significance. As with hypotheses 2 and 3, this finding suggests that some forms of state
power, in this case political capacity, do not impact the likelihood of preferred state
diplomatic intervention outcomes. The control variables unilateral intervention and
diplomatic intervention count are significant in nearly the same manner as previous
models. The findings of this model indicate that the implicit communication of state
power in diplomatic intervention may either be nonexistent or not sufficient to induce
favorable outcomes.

3

I also tested an alternative specification to the Polity Squared variable that included a binary measure of
autocracy and democracy (7 or higher on their respective measures) following Bueno De Mesquita et al.
(2005). These variables were generally not significant and produced non-results for the other control
variables.
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Table 5

Results for Political Capabilities Model

Models 5 and 6 include the variables for political capacity in order to provide
greater explanatory power in the models for hypothesis 2 and 3. In model 5 (Table 6),
the polity variable is included as an additional control variable for the military power
hypothesis. While the inclusion of the political capacity variables in model 5 alter the
direction of the relationship between the CINC variable and full settlement, all
relationships still fail to achieve significance. Following the pattern of previous models,
the variables for unilateral intervention and diplomatic intervention count are the only
control variables to achieve significance; unilateral intervention is significant in the
expected direction across all outcomes, while diplomatic intervention count is significant
in two of the three outcomes. This finding provides no additional support for hypothesis
2.
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Table 6

Results for Military Power including Political Capacity

In model 6 (Table 7), I add the political capacity variable as an additional control
variable for the hypothesis tested in model 3, which used Gleditsch’s (2002) Expanded
Trade and GDP data as a proxy for state economic capacity. This change is clearly
noticeable. While the coefficient for outcome 2 (partial settlement) remains positive as in
model 6, it now achieves statistical significance. It is notable that only the partial
settlement outcome achieves significance, as it rests in the middle of the range of
preferred outcomes. Although the coefficient is small, the range for the GDP variable is
large, which produces a larger effect than expected from the size of the coefficient.
The behavior of the control variables changes as well. Political capacity, which is
an addition that differentiates this model from model 3, is significant at the 5% level in
outcome 2 (partial settlement) only. The expected relationship is negative, which is
contrary to my expectations for this variable. The control variable unilateral intervention
still achieves significance across all outcomes, however the expected relationship
changes to positive in outcome 3, the full settlement outcome. Diplomatic intervention
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outcome now only achieves significance in outcome 3, and is no longer significant for
outcome 2. It is clear from the behavior of the independent and control variables that the
addition of the political capacity variable significantly impacts behaviors in the model.
The findings of this model indicate that economic capabilities, in some capacity, may
have a positive impact on the likelihood of achieving partial settlement, but not on
ceasefires (outcome 1) or on full settlements (outcome 3). I further explore this
relationship in models 7-12.
Table 7

Results for Economic Capabilities including Political Capacity

In models 7-12 I use the six individual components of the CINC variable (Singer
et al. 1972) to further explore the relationship apparent in model 6 between economic
capabilities and the increased likelihood of a partial settlement outcome. Although
models 2 and 5 testing military power were not significant, the CINC variables are still
valuable for testing individually as they are a mix of military, consumption, and
population-based measures. Given the outcome of model 6, there exists an underlying
process that appears to correlate some facets of economic influence with outcome.
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Disaggregating the component pieces of the CINC variable allows for testing of this
relationship to see if the correlation from my initial model is consistent with the outcomes
in the proceeding models. These component pieces include: military expenditure of
states, the amount of state military personnel, iron and steel production, energy
consumption, total population, and total urban population. I expect that the economicbased variables may produce similar results as model 5 regarding the likelihood of
achieving partial settlement.
Model 7 (Table 8) tests the impact of the CINC (Singer et al. 1972) individual
variable for military expenditure on outcome. The military expenditure variable is the
total military budget of a third-party state by year. Given the outcome of models 2 and 5,
I expect there to be no significant relationship. Contrary to this, the results indicate that
military expenditure and settlement outcome are correlated, achieving a significant
relationship for partial settlement only. While the coefficient is seemingly small, the
range of the variable is large, thus enabling the coefficient to substantively impact the
relationship. The control variables behave similarly to those in models 2 and 5; unilateral
intervention is negative and significant across all outcomes, while diplomatic intervention
count achieves positive significance in outcomes 2 and 3. Although the military
expenditures variable appears to be primarily concerned with military power, the existing
relationship may be explained by considering the economic-based aspects of the variable.
This finding supports the relationship observed in model 6, indicating the existence of a
causal relationship that achieves significance in outcome 2, partial settlement, only.

35
Table 8

Results for Military Expenditure including Political Capacity

In model 8 (Table 9) I test the relationship between the number of third-party state
military personnel by year and diplomatic intervention outcome (Singer et al. 1972). As
with model 7, I categorize military personnel as a military power variable and expect no
significant relationship given models 2 and 5. The results are consistent with the previous
empirical results; the coefficients have no consistent direction and do not achieve
significance for any diplomatic intervention outcome. The control variables results also
remain consistent; unilateral intervention is negative and significant across all outcomes,
while diplomatic intervention count is positive and significant for outcomes 2 and 3 only.
This finding provides further evidence that hypothesis 2, which posits that military power
may positively impact diplomatic intervention outcome, is unsupported.
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Table 9

Results for Military Personnel including Political Capacity

Models 9 and 10, which include variables measuring third-party state iron and
steel production and third-party state energy consumption, respectively, test the most
economic-related measures available of the CINC (Singer et al. 1972) component
variables. Given the outcome of model 6, models 9 and 10 should show similar results to
further support the economic capabilities theory of hypothesis 3.
Model 9 (Table 10) behaves consistently with the expected relationships from
previous models. A positive, significant relationship exists between the independent
variable, iron and steel production, and outcome 2 (partial settlement) only. The control
variables for model 9 also behave consistently with those in model 6. Since the range of
the variable is significantly smaller than other, expenditure-based measures, the
coefficient will not have as great of an effect on this relationship. The control variable
political capacity squared is also unexpectedly negative and significant, while the control
variables unilateral intervention and diplomatic intervention count follow the established
pattern of previous models. The coefficient sign of unilateral intervention, however, does
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not change to positive in model 9 as it does in model 6. Model 9 provides further support
for the economic capabilities hypothesis.
Table 10

Results for Iron and Steel Production including Political Capacity

In model 10 (Table 11), I continue testing of the CINC (Singer et al. 1972)
component variables. As with model 9, model 10 tests a production or consumptionbased economic indicator, in this case primary energy consumption. Also as with model
9, I expect model 10 to behave similarly in outcome to model 6. The results are consistent
with expectations. Primary energy consumption correlates positively with the partial
settlement outcome (outcome 2) only. Since the range of this variable is larger than that
of iron and steel production, but smaller than other expenditure-based variables, the effect
of the coefficient is small, but appreciable. Regarding control variables, there are two
differences; unlike models 6 and 9, the political capacity squared variable does not
achieve significance. In addition, while unilateral intervention and diplomatic
intervention fit the pattern of being significant in the expected directions, the sign for
unilateral intervention does not change to positive for outcome 3 as it does in model 6.
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Both models 9 and 10 have outcomes consistent with the expected relationships.
Positive, significant independent relationships exist between both iron and steel
production and state energy consumption and the likelihood of achieving outcome 2,
partial settlement. The similarity of outcomes between models 6, 7, 9, and 10 provides
further support for hypothesis 3.
Table 11

Results for Primary Energy Consumption including Political Capacity

Models 11 and 12 use the CINC (Singer et al. 1972) variables for total state
population and total state urban population. Unlike models 9 and 10, these variables are
not direct measures of economic capabilities. They do, however, represent the potential
for high state economic capacity, as a large populace provides a larger base for
production and consumption. With this in mind, I expect population and urban population
to be positively correlated with diplomatic intervention outcome. The results are
consistent with my expectations.
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Table 12

Results for Total Population including Political Capacity

Model 11 (Table 12), which uses the variable measuring total third-party state
intervenor population, positively correlates with an increased likelihood of all
intervention outcomes. All outcomes also achieve significance. The positive significance
of the variable across all outcomes is a marked difference from the significant
relationship between the independent variable and partial settlement only that is found in
models 6, 7, 9, and 10. As with previous models, the large range of the variable allows
for the small coefficient to still have sizeable effect on the relationship. The behavior of
the control variables in this model is more consistent with model 10; political capacity
squared does not achieve significance while unilateral intervention signifies positively
across all outcomes and diplomatic intervention count achieves significance at the 5%
threshold across only outcomes 2 and 3.
To demonstrate this relationship visually, Figure 1 shows the average marginal
effect of the total population variable on the outcome. Because the range of the variable is
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large, the coefficient has an appreciable impact. The average marginal effect of an
increase in total population produces a smaller likelihood of obtaining an outcome of 0
(no settlement or ongoing conflict) and an increased likelihood of an outcome of 2
(partial settlement).

Figure 1

Average Marginal Effects of Total Population

Model 12 (Table 13), using total state urban population, is similar to model 11;
unlike model 11, however, only outcomes 1 and 2 are correlated. The control variables
for unilateral intervention and diplomatic intervention count also behave similarly to
model 11. Also, as with model 11, the range of the urban population variable is great,
allowing a small coefficient to have a marked impact on the relationship at hand.
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Table 13

Results for Total Urban Population including Political Capacity

As with model 11, I visibly illustrate the relationship of model 12 in Figure 2. The
range of total urban population, although smaller than the range total population, is large
enough that the coefficient appreciably impacts the relationship. The average marginal
effect of an increase in total urban population produces a smaller likelihood of obtaining
an outcome of 0 (no settlement or ongoing conflict) and an increased likelihood of an
outcome of 2 (partial settlement).
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Figure 2

Average Marginal Effects of Urban Population

A notable difference between models 6, 7, 9 and 10 and models 11 and 12 is the
significance achieved across most diplomatic intervention outcomes, instead of just for
outcome 2, partial settlement. While the outcomes of models 11 and 12 lend support to
the economic capability hypothesis, this change in significance across all models may
also indicate that other facets of state economic capabilities, such as consumption-based
economic potential rather than production-based, may play a greater explanatory role in
supporting hypothesis 3.
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DISCUSSION
In the previous section I presented the results of models 1-12, which tested my
four hypotheses with additional tests of robustness for the findings. In this section I
briefly summarize my hypotheses and the resultant findings while also providing a
discussion of the outcomes in the context of intrastate diplomatic intervention research. I
conclude with a discussion of the limitations of this research and future areas of
investigation.
To test my theory, that capabilities of third-party states engaged in diplomatic
interventions positively impact the outcome of said interventions, I generated four
hypotheses. The first hypothesis tested the relationship between state and non-state actors
and diplomatic intervention outcomes (H1). The remaining hypotheses tested statespecific attributes I theorized may play a role in the intervenor-outcome relationship.
These are as follows: military power (H2), economic capabilities (H3), and political
capacity (H4).
Regarding my first hypothesis, the outcome of model 1 was not consistent with
my expectation. Rather than increase the likelihood of preferred diplomatic intervention
outcomes, state actors involved in diplomatic intervention decrease the likelihood of all
intervention outcomes. There is no support for my hypothesis which suggested that states,
just because they are states, are more likely to generate preferred intervention outcomes.
This result in in line with Lundgren’s (2016) research, which finds that IO’s with greater
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information gathering and field deployment capacities may outperform other groups as
mediators.
Although the results of model 1 suggest that non-state actors may be more
effective diplomatic intervenors in intrastate wars, it does not necessarily undermine
hypotheses 2-4. All states are not the same and, while they may underperform compared
to non-state actors, there still exists a continuum of success and failure regarding
intervention outcome that requires further exploration. A study interested in further
studying the comparative effectiveness of states versus non-states should consider
exploration of the underlying causal mechanisms that drive the results of model 1. By
attempting to isolate why non-states may be more effective intervenors, researchers and
policy makers alike may be able to increase the effectiveness of state intervenors, or
simply have a better understanding of which intervenor may be the most effective in a
particular situation.
To test my theory of intervention influence among states only, I used three
different aspects of state strength: military power (H2), economic capabilities (H3), and
political capacity (H4). The results of the analyses do not provide any support for
hypotheses 2 or 4, indicating that the military power or the political capacity of a state
may not play a noteworthy role in the intervention and mediation processes. This may be
interpreted in several ways. First, it is possible that while these attributes do not play a
direct role in the immediate outcomes of diplomatic interventions, they may be at play in
other components of the intervention process, such as the ability of a state to offer
mediation or execute a diplomatic intervention (Greig and Regan 2008). If this is the
case, state influence may be pivotal in bringing all parties together, but not necessarily
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indicative of any greater success in outcome. Second, and as noted previously in the
analysis section, it is possible that the implicit assurances of influential states that take
place during interventions are ineffective when compared to explicit, documented
commitments that culminate in ceasefires or settlements. A more formalized mediation
taking place with the help of any state actor, regardless of international influence, may be
more effective than informal mediations undertaken by powerful states.
Of my three, state-specific hypotheses, the only hypothesis that received
consistent significant results was hypothesis three, which speculated an existing
relationship between state economic capabilities and diplomatic intervention outcome.
Specifically, four direct indicators of economic capability (models 6, 7, 9, and 10)
exhibited positive, significant relationships between the measure of economic capability
and the likelihood of partial settlement only (there existed no significant relationship
between ceasefire or full settlement). The prevalence of this particular relationship is
compelling. This association indicates that some aspects of the economic capacity of
intervenor states may be sufficient to lead conflicting parties to a more defined resolution
than a ceasefire, in the form of partial settlement, but are not influential enough to
contribute to the preferred outcome, full settlement. It may be that the impact of
economically influential states only goes so far in negotiations and that variables related
to other aspects of the conflict or warring parties themselves may play a greater role in
achieving the most preferred diplomatic intervention outcome. If this is the case,
additional research on the subject should examine what additional intervenor or conflictlevel variables, in addition to the economic capacities of the intervenor state, may bring
about a higher likelihood of the most desirable intervention outcome.
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Combining the findings of models 6, 7, 9, and 10 with the findings of models 11
and 12, it is clear that there is some support for the hypothesis that aspects of third-party
state economic capability may positively influence diplomatic intervention outcome.
From the variables tested, both production- and consumption-based indicators lend
evidence to this relationship. Combining this with the insignificant relationships of my
other hypotheses, the findings indicate that if some aspect of a state intervenor may be
taken into account with the likely efficacy of the intervention in mind, economically
productive states may be the best choice. Conversely, states that are military powerful or
have high political capacity may not be any more effective intervenors than low- to midcapacity states.
Finally, while I discussed the specific model-by-model outcomes previously, I am
now addressing the general patterns and relevance of the control variables throughout
models 1-12. With some exceptions, the control variables for diplomatic intervention
count and the dichotomous variable for unilateral intervention achieved significance in
the expected direction throughout. While unilateral intervention appears to hamper the
likelihood of preferred diplomatic intervention outcome, the number of diplomatic
interventions in a conflict increases the likelihood of preferred outcomes. The persistent
significance of these variables indicates that these are relevant factors that may impact
intervention outcome, and thus should be included as factors in the analysis.
The control variable with the greatest impact is the addition of political capacity
indicators in models not directly testing political capacity as an independent variable. As
noted in the results section, the inclusion of political capacity modifies the previously
non-significant relationship testing economic capabilities and diplomatic intervention
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outcome and the resultant outcome is a relationship between the tested economic
capability measures and the likelihood of a partial settlement outcome. The observance of
this suppressed relationship, as well as the collinearity between the political capacity
indicator and economic capabilities variable, calls for caution in the above analysis, but
the continued observed relationship remains valuable for examination.
There are many limitations to this research. Foremost, intrastate wars are
complicated, multifaceted occurrences that have been explored academically in a
multitude of ways. I do not account for many extant theories which propose variables that
may also influence conflict outcome. These include: the role conflict-type may play in
outcome generation (Sambanis 2000; Fearon 2004; Cederman et al. 2010), non-state
third-party actors (Fortna 2004; Lundgren 2016), and intervention timing (Regan and
Stam 2000; Regan 2002), among many other factors. By not accounting for some of these
variables, the explanatory power of my models may be lacking and other relationships
may not be apparent. In a similar vein, my treatment of all diplomatic interventions as
interchangeable may also impact the viability and outcomes of the data. Consensual
mediations, informal or formal negotiations, diplomatic recall, and international forums
are each undertaken with different terms and expectations; disregarding the differences
among these tactics may not allow for the theories of my hypotheses to be evident.
Future research may proceed in many different directions. With this work, I
explore aspects of third-party state intervenors that may positively impact diplomatic
intervention outcome. Continuing with this, further analysis of the economic capabilities
hypothesis, for which some support is given in this paper, may reinforce the findings of
this paper while also expanding on which specific aspects of state economic ability (and
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thus which states themselves) may best impact diplomatic intervention outcome.
Widening the scope of this paper, it may also be useful to be able to make similar
comparisons as drawn in this paper concerning the capabilities and effectiveness of thirdparty non-state actors. If, as I find in hypothesis 1, non-state actors may be more effective
actors in diplomatic interventions, the efficacy of non-state actors may be a topic of
increased interest.
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CONCLUSION
This paper aims to explore a distinctive facet of the relationship between thirdparty diplomatic intervention and diplomatic intervention outcome. Specifically, I focus
on how the capabilities of third-party state actors may play a role in the final outcomes of
diplomatic interventions. The diplomatic focus of this research is intentional; while
structural interventions by third-parties may result in an increase in hostilities to bring
about conflict termination, diplomatic interventions emphasize tactics that seek to
decrease violence from the outset. By studying which actors have the highest likelihood
of achieving preferred intervention outcomes, researchers and policymakers alike may be
able to hone in on the most effective and peaceful processes for civil war termination.
Bearing the above in mind, I hypothesized at the beginning of this paper that
third-party state power, in a variety of forms, may influence diplomatic intervention
outcome. My findings offer mixed results. The analysis for two of the most conspicuous
forms of international state influence—military power and political capacity—indicates
no relevant relationship exists, while the relationship for the third hypothesized influence,
economic capabilities, gives promising, yet limited, support. The results suggest that
economic variables related to levels of third-party state consumption and production may
increase the likelihood of preferred diplomatic intervention outcome, but this relationship
stands for partial settlement only.
The results of this analysis are both puzzling and motivational. Additional
research concentrating on the effect of economically influential states may provide
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further insight into how state actors may effectively wield their international influence for
diplomatic purposes. Furthermore, it is possible that various facets of state power, and
thus powerful states themselves, may play effective roles in diplomatic intervention that
manifest in areas other than directly on outcome. More research is necessary to
understand how third-party states may effectively play a role in civil war diplomatic
interventions.
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Tabulation of State and Non-State Actors
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Table B.1

Results for Military Power Model

Table B.2

Results for Economic Capabilities Model
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Table B.3

Results for Political Capabilities Model

Table B.4

Results for Military Power including Political Capacity
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Table B.5

Results for Economic Capabilities including Political Capacity

